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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S CREDIT PROGRAMS 
Murray L. Weidenbaum, Director 
Center for the Study of American Business 
Washington University 
The arsenal of governmental power over the economy is extensive, in-
eluding the authority to tax, the ability to spend the proceeds of that 
taxation, and the capability of issuing rules and regulations determining 
or influencing private behavior. One of the lesser known components of 
that arsenal is the government's power to provide credit to various in-
dividuals and orqanizations in the economy. 
As will be demonstrated, most of the credit activities do not appear 
in the federal budget. Many do not involve any direct federal expendi-
ture at all. Hence, they seem to be a rather painless way of achieving 
national objectives. In the main, the federal government is "merely .. 
guaranteeing private borrowing or sponsoring ostensibly private institu-
tions. 
.: · ... 
Is this use of the governme.nt '·.$.·c-redit power- a variation of the 
proverbi a 1 "free 1 unch? '' Let us examine the costs as we 11 as the benefits 
that may flow from this often overlooked aspect of qovernmental interac-
tion with the private sector. 
The Variety of Governnent Credit Programs 
Over the years substantial numbers of credit programs have made their 
way through the legislative process of the federal government. These 
programs emerged on an~ hoc basis, with each program directed toward 
providinq assistance in overcoming a specific problem at hand. As a re-
sult of this gradual but very substantial accretion, federal credit pro-
gram subsidies are now provided to a great many and variety of sectors of 
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the American economy -- housing, agriculture, transportation, healt~, 
education, state and local governments, small business -- as well as to 
foreigners.lf The total amount of credit provided under federal auspices 
has risen substantially during the past decade. 
There are three major uses of the federal government•s credit power 
(see Table 1 for details). 
Direct loans by federal departments and agencies. Direct loans ex-
tended by federal agencies, such as the two percent loans made by the 
Rural Electrification Administration, generally involve significant sub-
sidies because the loans are made at interest rates below those available 
in the private sector. In many cases, the government also absorbs the 
administrative expenses ~nd losses arising from loan defaults, thus 
further increasing the amount of the subsidy. Although not formally con-
sidered a federal credit program, the relatively generous progress pay-
ments made by the Department of Defense represent interest-free provision 
of working capital to government contractors on a very large scale. 
Direct loans are still an important form of federal credit aid, account-
ing for almost $28 billion of the total of $99 billion of federal and 
federally-assisted credit extended during the fiscal year 1975. However, 
in recent years direct loans have been exceeded in size by the various 
guarantee programs and lending activities of government-sponsored but 
privately-owned credit agencies. 
Moreover, a rising share -- almost one-fifth in fiscal 1975 -- of 
these direct loans have been excluded from the budget totals. These are 
the lending activities of the so-called off-budget agencies of the federal 
government, such as the Rural Electrification Administration and the 
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Table 1 
MAJOR FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS, FISCAL YEAR 1975 
(New Commitments, in millions) 
... - Government 
Category Direct Loans Guaranteed Sponsored 
Ill - and Agency On Budget Off Budget Loans Enterprises Total 
Aid to Business 
Commerce $15 $699 714 
Interior 22 22 
Transportation 37 177 214 
Export-Import Bank $3,813 8,708 12,521 
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 100 1,723 1,823 
General Services 
Administration 72 72 
Small Business Admin-
istration 520 1,365 1,885 
U.S. Railway Association 34 34 
Subtotal 694 3,847 12,744 17,285 
Aid to Farmers 
Agriculture 6,329 1,060 8,577 15,966 
Farm credit agencies $20,910 20,910 
Subtotal 6,329 1,060 8,577 20,910 36,876 
Aid to Local Governments 
Housing and Urban 
Development 590 1,252 1,842 
Justice 40 40 
District of Columbia 232 232 
Subtotal 862 1,252 2,114 
.,. Aid to Individuals 
Health, Education, and 
~felfare 543 1,388 1,931 
Housing and Urban 
4,791.!/ Development 11,779 16,570 
Veterans Administration 524 3,60211 4,126 
Federal Home Loan Bank 
System 1,305 12,694 13,999 
Federal National Mortgage 
Association 4,434 4,434 
Student Loan Marketing 
Association 144 144 
Subtotal 14,151 9,781 17,272 41,204 
"' -
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Table 1 (continued) 
Government 
Category Direct Loans Guaranteed Sponsored 
and Agency On Budget Off Budget Loans Enteq~ri ses Total 
Aid to Foreign Governments 
Security assistance 437 616 1,053 
Development assistance 478 26 504 
Subtotal 915 642 1,557 
Miscellaneous 
Federal Financing Bankl! 
All other 95 6 101 
Subtotal 95 6 101 
GRAND TOTAL 23,046 4,907 33,002 38,182 99,137 
1/ Duplicate transactions have been eliminated. 
Source: Compiled from Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government, 
Fiscal Year 1977. 
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Export-Import Bank. These latter agencies are all part of the federal 
government, using federal funds and federal employees to carry on their 
activities. Their common characteristic is that in each case the Congress 
'~ -· has passed a law stipulating that some or all of their financial trans-
actions are not to be included in the budget. The justification often 
given is that these programs will ultimately generate offsetting revenues 
and hence be no burden to the taxpayer. However, this rationale is of 
dubious value. First of all, those revenues may not always equal the off-
budget outlays. And, secondly, many government programs which are included 
in the budget also generate offsetting receipts. Thus, the off-budget 
treatment is a subterfuge for understating the size of the budget and a 
mechanism for diluting the effectiveness of the budgetary review process. 
Loans guaranteed by federal departments and agencies. Loan guarantees 
now account for a major share of federal credit programs. The attractive-
ness of this mechanism to government policymakers stems largely from the 
fact that the loans themselves are made by private lenders and thus are 
excluded from the federal budget. Technically, all that the government 
does is to assume a contingent liability to pay the private lender if the 
private borrower defaults. Loans in this category include housing subsidy 
programs,some of which have experienced very high default rates in spite 
~ of their being backed by the security of real. property. Other new pro-
grams generate higher risks because they frequently.guarantee loans which 
require little or no collateral in connection with the guarantee. 
During the last several years, however, an interesting but unexpected 
movement has occurred between this category and direct off-budget loans. 
This has resulted from the formation of the Federal Financing Bank. The 
.. -
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basic reason for the Bank's establishment was to consolidate the market 
borrowings of the ri s i n·g ·number of federa 1 credit agencies. Such con so 1 i-
dation, it was reasoned, should enable the various federal credit agencies 
to raise funds at lower interest rates and also provide the Treasury 
Department with greater control over the timing and amount of borrowings 
by these agencies. To a substantial extent, the Bank has served that pur-
pose. However, its charter also gives it the authority to purchase many 
of the private loans which carry a federal guarantee. As a result, some 
of the effort to reduce the pressure on the budget via extending guarantees 
is being offset by rising federal borrowings to finance the repurchase of 
these guarantees. This involuted procedure is hard to defend on any ra-
tional ground. 
Loans by federally-sponsored agencies, such as the Federal National 
Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan Banks, and the farm credit 
agencies. These ostensibly private institutions are not included in the 
total of federal spending. They rais~ 'their funds primarily through bor-
rowing in the nation's capital markets. However, these privately-owned 
agencies possess various tax advantages and are able to borrow funds in 
the market at low interest rates because of the implicit government back-
ing of their debentures and other issues. 
The best known of these agencies, the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fanny Mae), has far more ties to the federal government than 
does the customary private corporation. The Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development, for example, is given "general regulatory power 11 in the com-
pany's charter. The Secretary of the Treasury must approve each of its 
sales of securities. The President appoints one-third of the membership 
~I 
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of its board of directors. Loans made by Fanny Mae and the other federal-
ly-sponsored agencies have increased sharply over the past decade. They 
now comprise the largest single form of federal credit assistance to the 
private sector. 
Impacts on Total Saving and Investment 
The conclusions of the empirical literature on the impacts of federal 
credit programs on saving and investment are clear. These programs do 
little if anything to increase the total flow of saving or investment in 
the American economy. They mainly change the share of investment funds 
going to a given industry or sector of the economy and, in the process of 
doing so, exert upward pressures on interest rates as investment funds are 
bid away from other sectors. 
In commenting on existing programs of federally-assisted credit to 
the private sector, Dr. Henry Kaufman, the distinguished economist with 
the investment house of Salomon Brothers, has written: "Federal agency 
financing does not do anything directly to ~nlarge the supply of savings ... 
In contrast, as agency financing bids for the limited supply of savings 
with other credit demanders, it helps to bid up the price of money."?:! 
In referring to borrowing by the federal government and its agencies, 
Dr. Albert Wojnilower has made a similar observation: 
"Because these governmental borrowers need have few 
if any worries about creditworthiness· or meeting 
interest payments, they can preempt as much of the 
credit markets as they choose. As a result, the 
Federal sector has become one of the most relentless 
sources of upward pressures on interest rates."3/ 
Even the supporters of proposed credit subsidies for energy develop-
ment admit to this effect. The following is taken from the statement to 
. -
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the House Science and Technology Committee by Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury Gerald Parsky, who was testifying in favor of financial incen-
tives for synthetic fuel demonstration plants: 
11 Such incentives increase the demand for capital 
while having little or no effect on the overall 
supply of capital. They tend to cause interest 
rates to rise and channel capital away from more 
economic to less economic uses... · 
In a comprehensive study of federal credit programs for the presti-
gious Commission on Money and Credit, Warren Law of Harvard University con-
cluded that they have created inflationary pressures in every year since 
World War II.Y Professor Patricia Bowers has noted what she terms 11 COsts 11 
of federal credit programs. One cost arises from the fact that, given the 
availability of funds, an: increase in credit for housing means lesser 
amounts for other borrowers. The two borrowing groups most adversely af-
fected by tight credit are state and local governments and small businesses. 
A further cost is that the operations of the federal credit agencies tend 
to increase the level of interest rates· above . the level that' would have 
prevailed if they had not entered the credit markets.§! 
This phenomenon occurs for a variety of reasons. The total supply 
of funds is broadly determined by household and business saving and the 
ability of banks to increase the money supply. This is the basic limit 
on the availability of funds referred to by Professor Bowers. The normal 
response of financial markets to an increase in th~ demand for funds by 
a borrower, such as is represented by a federal credit program, is an in-
crease in interest rates so as to balance out the demand for funds with 
the supply of saving. But the federal government's demand for funds is 
"interest-inelastic" (the Treasury will generally raise the money that it 
. -
'P 
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requires regardless of the interest rate) and the interest-elasticity of 
saving is relatively modest. Thus, weak and marginal borrowers will be 
"rationed" out of financial markets in the process while the Treasury 
and other borrowers pay higher rates of interest. The General Accounting 
Office has noted this shortcoming in its analysis of the proposed Energy 
Independence Authority: 
"The EIA•s ... guarantees would make projects it 
assists financially more attractive to private 
capital than conservation projects not backed by 
Federal guarantees. Thus, both its loans and 
its guarantees will siphon private capital away 
from those conservation projects which might have 
been able to obtain private financing in the ab-
sence of EIA operations." 
Government credit programs thus can have very different impacts on 
resource allocation than is the case with typical government tax and ex-
penditure actions. Taxation, for example, most heavily affects current 
consumption. As Norman H. Jones, Jr. has pointed out, if the Congress 
were to decide to promote more investment in synthetic fuels production 
through direct expenditures, most of tha funds to finance these outlays 
would be pulled away from current c~~~umption via taxation. 6/ 
But if the energy development were to be supported by deficit financ-
ing or government credit guarantees, the resources would be supplied at 
the expense of other capital demands. And as pointed out earlier, that 
would likely hit housing and small business loans disproportionately hard. 
Important insights into the effects of federal credit programs on 
capital markets have been provided by Bruce MacLaury, the President of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and a former deputy undersecretary of 
·the Treasury: 
"' . 
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11 The more or less unfettered expansion of Federal 
credit programs and the accompanying deluge of 
agency direct and guaranteed securities to be 
financed in the credit markets has undoubtedly 
permitted Congress and the Administration to claim 
that wonder of wonders -- something for nothing, 
or almost nothing. But as with all such sleight-
of-hand feats, the truth is somewhat different."?/ 
Dr. Maclaury goes on to point out that there are extra costs associated 
with introducing new government credit agencies to the capital markets. 
These costs involve selling issues that are smaller than some mtnimum 
efficiently tradeable size, and selling securities that only in varying 
degree approximate the characteristics of direct government debt in terms 
of perfection of guarantee, flexibility of timing and maturities, 11 Clean-
ness'' of instrument, et c~tera. As a result of such considerations, the 
market normally charges a premium over the interest cost on direct 
government debt of comparable maturity. That premium ranges from~ of one 
percent on the well-known federally-sponsored agencies such as Federal 
National Mortgage Association to more than ~ percent on such exotics as 
New Community Bonds. In general, if cost of financing were the only con-
sideration, it would be most efficient to have the Treasury itself pro-
vide the financing for direct loans by issuing government debt in the 
market. 
Reduced efficiency occurs in the economy by providing a federal 
11 Umbrella" over many credit activities without dist.inguishing their rela-
tive credit risks. A basic function that credit markets are supposed to 
perform is that of distinguishing different credit risks and assigning 
appropriate risk premia. This is the essence of the ultimate resource-
allocation function of credit markets. As an increasing proportion of 
, .. 
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issues coming to the credit markets bears the guarantee of the federal 
government, the ability of the market to differentiate credit risks in-
evitably diminishes. Theoretically, the federal agencies issuing or 
guaranteeing debt would perform this role, charging as costs of the pro-
grams differing rates of insurance premia. In practice, all of the pres-
sures are against such differential pricing of risks.~ This is a hidden 
cost of federal credit programs. 
Professor Henry Jacoby of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
discussed these concerns before the House Committee on Science and 
Technology while advocating a limited program of loan guarantees for 
synthetic fuel development: 
11 The problem with loan guarantees is that they tend 
to hide the true cost of the technology that is be-
ing demonstrated ... Thus the guarantee carries a hid-
den subsidy which masks the real economic cost of 
the energy produced - or saved - and clouds the 
issue of what the 'commercial' status of the tech-
nology would be without the guarantee ... 
Impacts on Sectors of the Economy 
The very nature of federal credit assistance is to create advantages 
for some groups of borrowers and disadvantages for others. The literature 
provides clear answers on who will tend to be rationed out in the process. 
It is unlikely to be the large well-known corporations or the U. S. 
Government. It is more likely to be state and loc~l governments, medium-
sized businesses, private mortgage borrowers not under the federal umbrella, 
and consumers, thereby contributing to additional economic and financial 
concentration in the United States. 
The competition for funds by the rapidly expanding federal credit 
programs also increases the cost to the taxpayer by raising the interest 
- 12 -
rate at which the Treasury borrows its own funds. As shown in Table 2, 
there has been a massive expansion in the size and relative importance of 
·\ · federa 1 government credit demands over the past decade. In 1960, the 
federal share of funds raised in private capital markets, using the Federal 
Reserve System•s flow-of-funds data, was about 12 percent. By 1970, the 
government•s share had risen to 23 percent, and reached 36 percent in 1975. 
Virtually every session of the Congress in recent years has enacted 
additional federal credit programs. Since 1960, the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) has been joined by the Government Na-
tional Mortgage Association (Ginne Mae), Student Loan Marketing Association 
(Sally Mae), and, most recently, the U. S. Railway Association (Fannie 
Rae). 
Subsidies in Credit Programs 
Substantial subsidy elements exist in most federal credit programs, 
which of course make these activities especially attractive to the re-
cipients of the benefits. The subsidy element is fundamental, in that the 
basic purpose of the government involvement in credit activities is to 
provide certain categories of borrowers with credit on terms that are more 
favorable than those available in private markets. 9/ 
As stated by the President•s Commission on Budget Concepts: 
11 Most Federal loan programs contain at least some 
element of subsidy. In fact, if this were not 
true, a serious question could be raised about 
the appropriateness of such activities being con-
ducted by the Federal Government rather than ~Y 
private financial institutions. To the extent 
that Federal loans include a subsidy element by 
lending at more favorable interest rates than the 
cost of money to the Government (or the even higher 
cost of money obtained through private sources) 
they are at least in part grants or transfer pay-
ments rather than loans. 11 10/ 
p 
Source: Federal Reserve System flow-of-funds accounts, Treasury Depart-
ment data. 
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To the extent that subsidies help to achieve social goals, by shifting 
resource use to patterns closer to the society's priorities, they can be 
~- regarded as beneficial. At the heart of a subsidy is a political decision 
to favor some at the expense of others. Because a credit subsidy involves 
p 
a balancing of interests, it would be useful to have fairly well-developed 
notions regarding the incidence of benefits and costs of any specific pro-
gram in question. In light of the variety of credit programs, it is 
simply not possible to make firm statements with broad applicability. We 
must rely on available data and analyses. 
In an intriguing study of the home mortgage purchase program of the 
Government National Mortgage Association, George Von Furstenberg has 
shown that the principal ~esult of that government credit program has not 
been to increase the volume of resources going into housing. Rather, the 
credit program has mainly provided arbitrary subsidies to many homeowners 
who otherwise would have had to pay more for their home mortgages. In 
addition, many of them could have obtained private financing in the ab-
sence of the government subsidy.111 
Most frequently the improved terms take the form of an interest rate 
that is lower than the rate charged to private borrowers. Also, the 
length of the loan and the loan-to-value ratio may be more favorable. In 
addition, subsidies may result from inadequate fees or premiums which do 
not cover administrative costs and losses on credit guarantees. At the 
heart of a subsidy is a political decision to favor some at the expense 
of others. 
Credit program subsidies may be discussed in terms of (1) the bene-
+.;t t" the ~O"""'"'Wer ("' .f.h,.. """'PPO"'tun.;+y' ""s+" +" +ho gove"'nmont or. f,3), I I U U I I U ' C..) 1, t: U I I I 1, I...V 1, vV .._ 1~ 1 • "'"'" ' -
the out-of-pocket or "cash cost" to the government. The benefit-to-
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borrower concept is perhaps the most attractive to the economist as a 
measure of the impact of federal credit aid on demand and on the alloca-
~ · tion of resources. Yet the benefit concept poses the most formidable 
measurement problems. Some lenders may use the insurance and guaranty 
, . 
p 
programs simply because they are there, making loans that they would have 
made in any case, though on somewhat more stringent terms. In contrast, 
guaranteed loans to submarginal borrowers may be, in principle, as income-
generating as government transfer payments. 
There is no conclusive method of measuring the extent to which loans 
under some guarantee programs might have been made without the government 
guarantee. This is particularly true of guaranteed loans at market rates 
of interest, such as the regular mortgage insurance program of the Federal 
Housing Administration and the Export-Import Bank guarantees. It is not 
clear in such self-supporting programs whether there is a substantial 
benefit to the borrower or whether in many cases the borrower would have 
been able to obtain nonguaranteed credit on essentially similar terms. 
On the other hand~ many loans would clearly not have been made with-
out the government guarantee. An extreme example is the loan guarantee 
program for public housing, where virtually all of the principal and in-
terest payments are made by the federal government. That is, the rental 
income from public housing projects barely covers current operating and 
maintenance expenses, and in some projects not even· those expenses are 
covered. Thus the public housing bonds are ultimately retired almost en-
tirely from annual debt service contributions by the federal government. 
Consequently, the credit program subsidy for a $10 million bond-
financed public housing project is approximately $10 million, and the 
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benefit to the borrower is equivalent to a $10 million cash grant. It 
will not be attempted here to measure the "opportunity costs" to the 
~- government of using its resources for federal loan programs. That is, 
given limited resources, what would be the return to the government (or 
to the private sector) from investment in alternative projects? 
Table 3 attempts to measure only the value of the interest rate sub-
sidy that accrues to federally-assisted borrowers. The subsidy is defined 
as the difference between the interest rate that the borrower pays under 
government assistance and the -rate that would have to be paid for a com-
parable private loan. These interest differentials arise in several ways. 
The interest rates used in the government credit program may be set by 
law below those prevailirig in private markets. Alternatively, the in-
terest rates may be set at the Treasury's borrowing costs, providing 
private borrowers credit at low rates otherwise available only to the 
federal government. In the case of the loan guarantees, the guarantee 
provides an implicit subsidy by eliminating the risk to the lender of loss 
through default. This ordinarily enables the borrower to obtain the lower 
interest rate which is usually associated with less risky investments. 
As an estimate of the interest rates that would be available to 
private borrowers in the absence of federal credit programs, a 10 percent 
rate has been assumed here. That figure is considered to be a reasonable 
estimate of the average private sector cost of borrowing. Because in-
terest subsidies occur throughout the life of a loan, the calculation of 
interest subsidies requires the conversion of a stream of payments into 
a single "present value." This capitalization is performed by discounting 
future subsidies by 10 percent a year before accumulating them into a 
Table 3 
INTEREST SUBSIDIES IN FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS (Fiscal Year 1975, Doilars in millions) 
Annual 
Subsidy 
Borrower Loan Terms Per $100 Cumulative 
Agency and Program Percent Years million Commitments Subsidy 
Direct Loans 
Funds appropriated to the President: 
International security assistance 6.0 10.0 2.5 437 69 
International development assistance 4.0 40.0 5.2 478 243 
Agriculture: 
Price support 7.1 2.1 1.6 1,101 33 
CCC: Public Law 480 2.3 33.0 6.1 747 436 
Farmers Home Administration 5.2 33.7 4.1 4,481 1,758 
Rural Electrification Administration 5.5 35.0 3.9 1,241 398 
I Health, Education, and Welfare: 
I' Education and health education 3.0 15.0 4.6 380 133 
....... 
Medical facilities 6.7 25.0 2.7 30 7 
Housing and Urban Development: 
Urban renewa 1 6.8 . 7 1. 8 493 6 
Low-rent public housing 
--- 1.5 8.4 82 9 
Federal Housing Administration 9.5 40.0 .5 842 39 
Government National Mortgage Assn. 8. 5" 27.0 1.2 11,779 1,371 
Housing for elderly 9.8 40.0 .2 
Veterans Administration: 
Insurance policy loans 5.0 15.0 3.4 152 40 
Education loans 6.5 6.0 2.1 1 * Housing 9.0 29.4 .9 369 30 
District of Columbia 8.0 30.0 1.7 232 38 
Export-Import Bank 8.1 6.0 1.1 3,813 191 
Federal Financing Bank (net) 7.8 5.0 1.3 1,125 57 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board 8.0 30.0 1.8 1,305 219 
i -40 "' < - c:;, • 
Agency and Program 
Direct Loans 
Small Business Administration: 
Business and investment loans 
Disaster loan fund 
United States Railway Association 
Total--Major subsidized direct loans 
Guaranteed Loans 
Health, Education, and Welfare: 
Health maintenance organizations 
Medical facilities 
~ Student loan insurance 
Housing and Urban Development: 
Urban renewal 
Low-rent public housing 
Mortgage insurance (subsidized) 
Interior: Indian loans 
Department of Transportation: WMATA 
Table 3 (continued) 
Borrower Loan Terms 
Percent Years 
6.9 
5.3 
7.5 
7.0 
6.7 
4.4 
4.6 
5.0 
8.0 
6.3 
8.7 
11.0 
20.0 
20.0 
25.0 
13.0 
.7 
41.5 
40.0 
20.0 
40.0 
Total--Major subsidized guaranteed loans 
Agency Debt Issues Financed By 
Federal Financing Bank 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
U.S. Postal Service 
Total--Debt issue subsidies 
Grand total 
* Less than $0.5 million. 
,. . ' 
8.0 
8.0 
3.0 
3.0 
Source: Same as Table 1. 
Annual 
Subsidy 
Per $100 
million 
1.9 
3.0 
2.5 
2.3 
2.7 
3.7 
6.5 
7.8 
4.4 
1.5 
3.3 
1.1 
1.1 
Commitments 
279 
241 
89 
1,299 
493 
741 
476 
177 
1,435 
1,000 
~ f .:.. •• 
Cumulative 
Subsidy 
.. , 
31 
48 
5,156 
22 
345 
21 
566 
206 
58 
1,217 
41 
29 
70 
6,443 
I \ 
) 
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single amount. 
The results are shown in Table 3. On the basis of the as$umptions 
made here, federal credit extended in the . fiscal year 1975 will generate 
$6.4 billion of subsfdies during the life of the loans made during that 
twelve month period. That amount is equal to about 7 percent of the total 
federal and federally-assisted credit provided during that year. The 
proportion of subsidy to total amount of the loan, however, varies sub-
stantially from program to program. Unlike subsidies in other federal 
spending programs, credit subsidies tend to be hidden. Hence, their 
magnitude remains generally unknown to either the public or to most 
governmental decision-makers. 
The Foreseeable Trend 
The upward trend in the size and number of federal credit programs 
shows no signs of slowing down. During the last few years, the Congress 
has approved a new loan guarantee program to assist industry in the com-
mercial development of energy from geothermal resources (the Geothermal 
Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1974), voted credit 
to the nation's largest city (the New York City Seasonal Financing Act), 
and authorized the Federal Energy Administration to guarantee loans for 
new underground coal mines (the Energy Policy and Conservation Act). In 
addition, several congressional committees have held hearings on proposed 
legislation to provide as much as $100 billion for credit assistance via 
an Energy Independence Authority. In November 1976, the governors of 
seven northeastern states called for the creation of a Regional Energy 
·Development Corporation, which would use federally guaranteed bonds to 
finance coal · development and other projects to foster regional growth. 
I I 
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In December 1975, the Farmers Home Administration (an agency of the 
~.S. Department of Agriculture) expanded its credit operations to provide 
up to a 90 percent guarantee on private loans that companies obtain for 
use on plants in rural areas. There has been little if any offsetting 
reductions during recent years in the scope of existing federal credit 
activities. 
The future expansions in government credit programs are also likely 
to be qualitatively different from existing loan and guarantee activities. 
Currently, the major loan guarantee programs, such as those of the Federal 
Housing Administration, are secured generally by readily marketable as-
sets, such as real estate, inventories, and production equipment. The 
individual loan risks are $mall; broadly diversified portfolios reduce 
the risks for the program as a whole. 
But many of the proposed new loan guarantee programs, especially in 
the energy ar~a, have very different risk characteristics. According to 
Norman H. Jones, Jr., the typical project whose financing would be 
guaranteed would be far larger, in both absolute size and relative to the 
tqtal credit program. This would clearly be the case for a $1 billion 
project in a $6 billion synthetic fuel program. New energy developments 
involve substantial technical uncertainty and doubt as to the costs and 
profitapility of the project, even in the event of technical success. 
~oreover,the assets to be pledged as collateral would be highly specialized 
and perhaps not readily marketable. 121 
Thus the relative and absolute risks involved in some of the proposed 
extensions of government credit power miqht be much greater than in the 
-past. The same might also be true in the case of long-term credit extensions 
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by the federal government to municipalities facing severe financial pres-
sures. The point being made here is not to oppose automatically every 
proposed extension of governmental credit. Rather, the concern is with 
understanding t~e full extent of the contingent liability that is being 
assumed, contingent liabilities which could result in federal assumption 
of large amounts of unpaid debts. In such event, the guarantee mechanism 
would become a major subsidy, which the Congress might or might not wish 
to vote for were it deciding the matter directly. 
Summary 
Contrary to the popular view, government credit programs are not cost-
less, either to the Treas~ry or to citizens in general. Three distinct 
cos~s of these government programs can be identified: 
1. The economic cost. As they do little if anything to increase the 
total supply of investment funds in the economy, government credi.t 
programs take credit away from some unsubsidized borrowers. An 
economic cost results from the operations of federal credit programs 
to the extent that the contribution to society of the credit recipients 
is less than that of the unsubsidized borrowers who were rationed out 
of the market. 
2. The initial fiscal cost. Government credit programs increase the 
total size of government-related borrowings -- a broad category which 
ranges from the Treasury's own securities to the private issues which 
are guaranteed by federal government agencies. To a considerable ex-
tent, the investment community looks upon all of these items as govern-
ment-related, although individual investors may distinguish between 
Treasury securities and issues of the credit agencies. As a result 
. ,J • 
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of these interdependencies, an expansion in the total volume of govern-
ment-related credit results in a higher level of interest rates being 
paid by that entire category. The fiscal cost to the government arises 
because some portion of those higher interest rates (the part servic-
ing the public debt) is a direct charge to the federal budget. 
3. The ultimate fiscal cost. When defaults occur on the part of the bor-
rowers whose credit is guaranteed by the federal government, the 
Treasury winds up bearing the ultimate cost of the credit. In such 
cases, government credit programs become a form of backdoor spending, 
whereby federal expenditures are incurred in the absence of direct 
appropriations for the purpose. 
Several ways have been suggested to deal with the various problems 
that arise from the expansion of federal credit programs. One general ap-
proach is to require that all proposals to create new federal credit. pro-
grams or to broaden existing ones be accompanied by a detailed analysis. 
This appraisal would result in a quantification of the subsidy by showing 
the relationship between (a) the interest rate actually charged to the 
borrower participating in the federal credit program, (b) the rate which 
would be charged by competitive and efficient private lenders, and (c) 
the rate necessary to cover the government's costs, including the possi-
bility of default. 
One way of controlling federal credit programs is to impose a ceil-
ing on the total borrowing of federal and federally-sponsored credit 
agencies, both those 11 in 11 and those 11 0Ut 11 of the budget -- thus restrict-
ing their ability to extend credit. In addition, the Congress could 
enact a ceiling on the overall volume of debt created under federal loan 
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guarantees. It would be important to establish procedures to permit re-
vi~w of commitments far enough in advance to permit evaluating their 
likely impact when the commitments become actual loans. 
A variation of the first approach is to establish controls over the 
total volume of federally-assisted credit directly. Even though no im-
mediate impact on the federal budget may be visible in most cases, the 
influence on the allocation of resources and on the composition of in-
come and employment -- may be very considerable. At present, many of 
these federal credit programs tend to have virtually a blank check on 
the nation's credit resources. Under this second method, they would no 
longer be treated as a 11 free good ... 
A third method of c6ntrollin9 federal credit programs more effective-
ly is to require these credit programs to be reviewed and coordinated 
along with other federal programs in the preparation of the governme~t's 
annual budget and economic plans. At the present time, numerous federal 
credit programs -- guaranteed and insured loans, and loans by federally-
sponsored enterprises -- escape regular budget and program review. 
Perhaps the .most fundamental proposal for dealing with the problem 
of federal credit does not relate to these credit programs at all, but 
with the underlying conditions of which they are symptoms. Hence, if we 
can create an economic climate more conducive to private saving and in-
vestment, that will reduce the need for private borrowers to seek federal 
credit assistance. The creation of that climate may require a tax system 
which tilts in favor of saving rather than consumption and a fiscal 
policy which avoids the large Treasury deficits whose financing competes 
with private borrowers. Until these fundamental changes are achieved, 
continued pressures for expansion of federal credit programs seems likely. 
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